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MORPHOPRAGMATIC PHENOMENA IN HUNGARIAN
ferenc kiefer
Abstract
Morphopragmatics is defined as the relationship between morphology and pragmatics,
in other words, it investigates pragmatic aspects of patterns created by morphological
rules. The paper discusses three morphopragmatic phenomena in Hungarian. The first
one concerns the use of the excessive which does not add semantic information to the
superlative and carries purely pragmatic information. It is used to express the highest
possible degree of some property and it carries the conversational implicature that the
speaker wants to draw the listener’s attention to the importance of what he is saying.
The second problem discussed has to do with the pragmatics of the diminutive suffix.
The semantic meaning of the diminutive suffix is ‘small’ or ‘a little’ (the latter occurs
with mass nouns), which, however, is often overridden by the pragmatic meaning.
In most cases, the use of the diminutive signals a positive emotional attitude, but it
may carry a pejorative meaning, too. Finally, the third phenomenon concerns the
pragmatics of the possibility suffix -hat/-het . From among the various pragmatic
meanings the deontic speech acts are well known from other languages. There are,
however, several other uses which seem to be typical of Hungarian. Two of these
are particularly interesting: (a) the context may turn possibility into necessity, (b) the
verb mond ‘say, tell’ suffixed by the possibility suffix may carry the pragmatic meaning
‘say/tell in vain’. In addition to these two uses, several others will be discussed.
1. Introduction
Morphopragmatics investigates the relationship between morphology and
pragmatics. Semantic meaning is not dependent upon the context of the
utterance: it is predictable on the basis of lexical meaning, sentential
context and the syntactic structure of the utterance. On the other hand,
pragmatic meaning also depends on the speech situation and is not pre-
dictable in general. Speech situation includes, among other things, the
speaker, the listener, the relationship between speaker and listener, as
well as the time and place of utterance. Pragmatic meaning entails se-
mantic meaning; hence the investigation of the former must take the latter
as its starting point. The main task of pragmatics is the investigation
1216–8076/$ 20.00 c© 2004 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
326 ferenc kiefer
of meaning as determined by the speech situation, whereas the descrip-
tion of speech-situation-independent meaning is the job of semantics.1
In this paper, the notion of pragmatics is understood as specified above,
similarly to my earlier papers and book (Kiefer 1983a;b; 1999; 2000).
Morphology is pragmatically relevant whenever an affix (whether in-
flectional or derivational) occurring in a morphologically complex word or
a pattern of compounding refers to the speech situation, making one or
some of its parameters manifest. Morphopragmatics investigates prag-
matic aspects of patterns created by morphological rules, rather than
those of individual morphological objects. In other words, the issue is
not what pragmatic consequences follow from the use of, say, diminutive
lábacska ‘little foot’ or kezecske ‘little hand’—but rather whether the rule
creating diminutive forms (briefly: the diminutive suffix) has some prag-
matic consequence, and if it does, what kind of pragmatic consequence
it has, with respect to a well-defined semantic range of bases. Pragmatic
meaning may of course vary depending on what semantically determined
subclass of bases the rule is applied to.2 In that respect, morphoprag-
matics does not differ from morphosemantics; in the case of the latter,
semantics is made to bear on morphological rules.
Morphopragmatics has to be distinguished both from lexical prag-
matics and from syntactic pragmatics.3 Lexical pragmatics deals with
pragmatic aspects of lexemes. For instance, two lexemes with identical
denotative meanings may refer to two different speech situations: eszik
‘eat’ vs. zabál ‘devour’, alszik ‘sleep’ vs. durmol ‘saw the wood’ (Kecskés
2003). Lexicalised morphological formations also belong here: elromlik
‘break down’ vs. bedöglik ‘go phut’, meghal ‘die’ vs. elpatkol ‘pipe off’,
etc. The investigation of pragmatic consequences, if any, of syntactically
required affixes belongs to the realm of syntactic pragmatics. If, for in-
stance, there is a pragmatic difference between elnökül választ ‘vote sy for
1 Theories treating semantics as a separate module accept this interpretation of
pragmatics. Cf. Swart (1998, 11–4) and Kearns (2000, 254–81), to mention two
recent textbooks on semantics.
2 The input conditions of a morphological rule include the meaning of the base and
that of the affix. The meaning of the derivative will be compositional and is part
of the output of the rule.
3 Obviously, phonology also has its pragmatic aspects; hence we can further speak
of phonological pragmatics. Since, however, morphopragmatics can hardly be
confused with phonological pragmatics, the only areas that have to be explicitly
demarcated from morphopragmatics here are lexical and syntactic pragmatics.
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the role of chairman’ and elnöknek választ ‘vote sy into the chair’, then the
discussion of that pragmatic difference is the task of syntactic pragmatics
(Dressler–Merlini-Barbaresi 1993).
Morphopragmatics entails semantics; hence in investigating morpho-
pragmatic phenomena one must first determine the semantics of some
process of inflection or word formation and then derive pragmatic mean-
ing from it, in view of the sentential context and the speech situation.
Sentential context only plays a role in a more exact determination of the
semantic meaning of a sentence/utterance.
The existence of morphopragmatic phenomena can be primarily ex-
pected in areas where there are competing morphological rules (for in-
stance, in the case of the denominal verb forming suffixes -(V)z and
-(V)l), or where a morphological rule contributes to the denotative mean-
ing of a word to a very slight extent or not at all (this is the case with
the diminutive suffix), or where a morphological rule is not prototypical
for the given area (inflection, derivation, compounding). For instance,
comparative/superlative formation is not prototypical either as a process
of inflection or as one of derivation (cf. Dressler 1989).4
In this paper, I will discuss some phenomena of Hungarian morphol-
ogy that are especially interesting from a morphopragmatic point of view;
in particular, the excessive, diminutive formation, and the modal suffix
-hat/-het ‘may, can’. On the basis of Dressler’s criteria, none of these can
be regarded as prototypical cases of derivation.5 This is the only prop-
erty that all three phenomena share; what motivates their discussion here
is that the pragmatic relevance of morphology is the most conspicuous
within Hungarian derivation in just these three cases.
4 Positing a continuum between inflection and derivation has a number of advan-
tages: (a) it explains the order of derivational, in addition to inflectional, suffixes;
(b) it gives an explanation for phenomena of the acquisition of morphology; (c)
it makes pragmatic relevance predictable. Dressler (1989) makes use of twenty
criteria in determining the differences in degree between inflection and deriva-
tion. Only three of those criteria will be mentioned here: (a) inflection is more
productive than derivation as the latter involves various limiting factors; (b) pro-
totypical inflection does not lead to a change of word class, whereas prototypical
derivation does; (c) inflection serves syntax (has syntactic consequences), whereas
in the case of derivation syntactic relevance only shows up via the change of word
class involved.
5 Generative grammar, thinking as it is exclusively in terms of dichotomies, has to
make its choice of whether it regards -hat/-het as an inflectional or a derivational
suffix, whereas theories that accept continua do not have to do that.
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2. The excessive6
In the Hungarian National Text Corpus,7 a number of examples involving
the excessive can be found (see (1) and (2)). As the examples in (2)
show, the prefix leg- may occur as many as three times in a given word
form (but more than two occurrences of leg- are rare, even though leg-
prefixation is in principle freely iterable, restricted by productional and
perceptual considerations only). Excessive formation is fully productive
(all gradable adjectives can be prefixed for the excessive) and lexicalised
instances do not occur.
(a)(1) Mondhat bárki bármit, a szerelem a világon a legesleg jobb dolog.
‘No matter what anybody says, love is absolutely the best thing in the world.’
(b) A legeslegnagyobb öröm félelem nélkül élni.
‘To live without fear is absolutely the greatest pleasure.’
(c) A király [. . .] berontott a trónterembe, annak is a legeslegeldugottabb sar-
kába, ott dühöngött [. . .].
‘The king [. . .] rushed into the presence chamber, into absolutely the most
remote corner of it, and went on fretting and fuming there [. . .].’
(d) Balmazújvárosból jött, a legeslegszegényebbek mélyvilágából.
‘He comes from Balmazújváros, the depths of absolutely the deepest poverty.’
(e) [. . .] én vagyok a legeslegrosszabb kedvű.
‘[. . .] I am in absolutely the worst mood of all.’
(a)(2) [. . .] az ellenőrzöttek ugyanazt a trükköt használják, mint az ellenőrzők
legeslegesleg felsőbb főnöke.
‘[. . .] those controlled make use of the same trick as the absolutely absolutely
topmost boss of the controllers.’
(b) Szerintem a legeslegeslegfinomabb csokiból kettő van [. . .].
‘I guess we have two pieces of absolutely absolutely the best chocolate [. . .].’
The superlative, as is known, semantically expresses the highest degree
along some scale of values. There is nothing better than the best, nothing
greater than the greatest, nothing more remote than the most remote,
6 The pragmatics of the excessive was first discussed in Dressler – Kiefer (1990).
This section is a more elaborate version of what was said in that paper.
7 All examples cited in this paper (unless noted otherwise) have been gleaned for
me from the Hungarian National Text Corpus by Gábor Kiss whom I wish to
thank here. The Corpus contains approx. 150 million running words at present;
I have looked at roughly 500 randomly chosen occurrences of each of the patterns
under scrutiny here, with a roughly ten-word context taken into consideration in
each case.
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nobody poorer than the poorest, nothing worse than the worst. There-
fore, the superlative and the excessive are not different semantically; it is
only in pragmatic terms that the latter can differ from the former.8 For
instance, in (1d), the superlative would do just as well since there can
be no semantic difference between leg- and legesleg-: whoever is poorer
is poor, and whoever is the poorest is even more so; there is no further
room for even deeper layers of poverty (semantically speaking). Thus,
the function of the excessive must be something else: it expresses that
the speaker thinks the place where the person comes from is as poor as
can be and that he would like to draw the listener’s attention to that fact
emphatically. The superlative refers to the highest degree of a scale, thus
x is the poorest means that of all the individuals considered, x represents
the poorest one. This is exactly what the excessive means, too—except
that it also suggests that x could not possibly be even poorer than he
already is and that the speaker would like to draw the listener’s attention
to that. Accordingly, the excessive always has some emotional colouring,
as opposed to the superlative that is usually the result of factual com-
parison (but see (3)). The semantic meaning of superlative and excessive
is therefore the same, but the latter, as opposed to the former, carries
some pragmatic meaning as well.
In everyday speech, the excessive is one way of expressing a hyper-
bole. In a hyperbole, what is big is seen/shown to be bigger than life,
what is small is presented as smaller than it actually is, a feature that
increases the perceived intensity of the phenomenon at hand. Even a
simple superlative may often do that, e.g., when a deceased relative is
described in a death notice as “the most faithful husband, the best fa-
ther”, and so on. A sequence of superlatives or excessives is especially
well suited to arousing the listener’s attention, to heighten tension. Here
is a widely known literary example. Madame de Sévigné begins one of
her letters to her daughter as follows:9
(3) What I will write about now is the most surprising, the most amazing, the most
wonderful, the most fascinating, the most triumphant, the most astounding, the
most unbelievable, the most unexpected, the most gigantic and the tiniest, the
most ordinary and the brightest, even today the most clandestine, the most glam-
orous, and the most enviable history.
8 In Dressler – Kiefer (1990) I mistakenly claimed that there is a presuppositional
difference between the superlative and the excessive.
9 Cited in Hungarian translation by Fónagy (1975, 481).
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If we replace all superlatives in (3) by excessives, the passage only be-
comes even more effective.
What is more urgent is urgent enough; what is the most urgent is
obviously even more so. Similarly, more shameful is shameful, and clearly
the most shameful is also that. The most urgent is the highest degree
of urgency: absolutely the most urgent cannot be more urgent than that:
the excessive and the superlative do not differ semantically:
(a)(4) Milyen feladatok megoldását látja legsürgősebbnek?— A legeslegsürgősebb
az M1-es autópályát üzemeltető társaság pénzügyi gondjainak megoldása.
‘What do you think are the most urgent tasks?— Absolutely the most ur-
gent one is to solve the financial troubles of the company running the M1
motorway.’
(b) [. . .] a túlzófok használata sem merész, az a legeslegszégyenletesebb, amikor
a szégyen lehetőségét is kétségbe vonja [. . .].
‘[. . .] it is not too bold to use the excessive here: absolutely the most shameful
thing is that he doubts even the possibility of shame [. . .].’
In (4a), the speaker wishes to draw his listeners’ attention to the ur-
gency of the task, and in (4b), to the shameful character of the situation
concerned. In the given speech situations, the highest possible degree of
urgency and the highest imaginable degree of shamefulness is referred to.
Almost half of the 500 utterances involving excessive, chosen at ran-
dom from the corpus, include the forms legeslegjobb ‘absolutely the best’,
legeslegnagyobb ‘absolutely the biggest/greatest’, and legeslegújabb ‘abso-
lutely the newest’. Further very frequent forms (with 20 to 30 occurrences
each) are legeslegutolsó ‘absolutely the very last’, legeslegvégső ‘absolutely
the most final’, legeslegelső ‘absolutely the very first’, legeslegelőször ‘ab-
solutely the very first time’, legeslegutoljára ‘absolutely the very last
time’, legeslegvégére ‘absolutely to the very end’, legeslegelején ‘abso-
lutely in the very beginning’, legeslegvégén ‘absolutely in the very end’.
Consider a few examples:
(a)(5) A szakszervezeti főbizalmi jelentéséből a legeslegutolsó bekezdést hadd olvas-
sam el [. . .].
‘Let me read out absolutely the very last paragraph of the report of the chief
trade union steward [. . .].’
(b) Az igazság az, hogy a megszakítás az a legeslegvégső eszköz, amihez a sport-
szakmai személyzet nyúl [. . .].
‘The truth is, interruption is absolutely the last measure that the body of
sports experts will take [. . .].’
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(c) [. . .] Svédország külügyminisztere a legeslegelső feladatnak nevezte, hogy
[. . .].
‘[. . .] the foreign minister of Sweden said it was absolutely the first task of
all to [. . .].’
(d) Minden feltört dióba, szétzúzott kő belsejébe te pillantasz be legeslegelőször.
‘You will be absolutely the first one to glance into every cracked nut, into
every smashed stone.’
In all these cases, the use of the excessive can be paraphrased as follows:
the speaker wants to draw the listener’s attention to the importance of the
event he is speaking about. Words that unambiguously define (extreme
points of) spatial order or temporal sequence are semantically ungradable.
Even utolsó ‘the last’ and legutolsó ‘the very last’ are not semantically
different; hence legutolsó ‘the very last’ and legeslegutolsó ‘absolutely the
very last’ cannot involve any semantic difference, either. By using the
excessive in (5a), the speaker wants to suggest that he considers the last
paragraph of the report to be important (in the given speech situation).
The same applies to legeslegvégső ‘absolutely the most final’ in (5b).
In (5c), the context is Hungary joining the European Union, an event
that the speaker probably considers to be an important task even more
than the Swedish foreign minister does. Likewise in (5d), it is the wider
context that explains the use of the excessive: the text is about secrets
and miracles. The speaker wants to call the listener’s attention to these.
It is interesting to note that the excessive never occurred in the
corpus as the opposite of a positive or comparative (and rarely as the
opposite of a superlative) adjective, i.e., no examples similar to the con-
structed ones below (that is, where the excessive is used instead of the
repetition of an adjective in the positive) have been found, though it is
clear that the excessive can be used as a corrective device.10
(a)(6) Mi az utolsó határidő? — A legeslegutolsó határidő augusztus 31.
‘What is the last deadline? — Absolutely the very last deadline is 31 August.’
(b) Szép ruhát vegyek fel? — A legeslegszebbet.
‘Shall I wear a pretty dress?— Absolutely the prettiest possible.’
This is probably due to the fact that the corpus does not contain a large
amount of dialogues.
In sum, the excessive does not differ semantically from the superla-
tive: both signal the highest degree of the property referred to by the ad-
10 See also Dressler – Kiefer (1990, 71).
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jective. Whatever the excessive additionally conveys in the given speech
situation belongs to pragmatics. In a pragmatic interpretation of the ex-
cessive, an important role is played by the speaker’s intention, the aim he
wants to achieve with what he says, the strategy employed. The listener
knows that the excessive is semantically identical with the superlative;
hence he also knows that it is not the denotative meaning of the utter-
ance that the speaker wants to enrich by using the excessive. The use
of that form can only be relevant if the speaker wishes to convey some
pragmatic meaning that cannot be expressed by the denotative meaning.
As we have seen, that pragmatic meaning is that the speaker wants to
draw the listener’s attention to the importance of what he is saying by
emphasising the highest possible degree of some property. That mean-
ing appears to the listener as a conversational implicature. In the case
of words unambiguously describing spatial order or temporal sequence,
the superlative carries a pragmatic meaning already; the excessive just
strengthens it even more.11 In that case, we cannot speak of the highest
possible degree of some property in the first place.
3. The diminutive suffix
In what follows, the pragmatic meanings of the diminutive suffixes -cska/
-cske and -ka/-ke will be discussed; we ignore the diminutive suffix -i .
Of the two suffixes mentioned, -cska/-cske is the more productive one
since its use is limited by fewer conditions.12 The two suffixes do not
differ either semantically or pragmatically. The basic meaning of the
diminutive suffix is ‘small, a little’; the meaning ‘a little’ (i.e., ‘not much’)
occurs with mass nouns (e.g., tejecske ‘a little milk’). However, that basic
meaning is often overridden by the pragmatic meaning (Dressler–Kiefer
1990; Dressler–Merlini-Barbaresi 1993; Kiefer 1998; and see below). The
derivational process is of almost unlimited productivity in the case of
monomorphemic bases, and lexicalisation is very infrequent.13
11 Comparative forms of elején ‘in the beginning of’, végén ‘in the end of’, utolsó
‘the last’ do not exist.
12 The distribution of the two diminutive suffixes essentially depends on phonological
properties of the base. The issue is discussed in detail in Kiefer – Ladányi (2000).
13 Derived words often preclude the use of a diminutive suffix. For instance, abstract
nouns in -ság/-ség ‘-ness’ cannot be diminutivised (*jóságocska ‘little goodness’,
*szélességecske ‘little width’); nor can deverbal nouns in -ás/-és ‘-ing’ denoting
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The speaker can always use a diminutive suffix to convey some prag-
matic meaning: e.g., fonémácska ‘small phoneme’ (referring either to
a phoneme that is the speaker’s special favourite or to one that has a
very limited distribution), definíciócska ‘little definition’ (the definition
is either not very significant or else it is not full, not faultless, etc.),
implikatúrácska ‘tiny implicature’ (minor, insignificant implicature, or
one that is the speaker’s favourite, etc.). A more exact definition of the
pragmatic meaning involved can only been given if the wider sentential
context and the speech situation are known.
In this section, I will provide a more detailed overview of the typical
uses of the diminutive suffix in Hungarian than is given in the papers
cited above, on the basis of the material of the Hungarian National Text
Corpus. I wish to emphasise, however, that the discussion will be re-
stricted to the typical uses.14 The occurrence of diminutive forms cannot
be predicted; but the typical speech situations in which they tend to
be used can be listed. We will see that the pragmatic meaning of the
diminutive suffix can be derived, in general, from its semantic meaning,
the sentential context, and the speech situation. Also, it is possible to
determine the typical semantic fields that are compatible with the given
pragmatic meaning of the diminutive suffix. It is to be emphasised, how-
ever, that in principle the speaker can use the diminutive form of any
base at any time; incompatibility may only arise between certain lexical
fields and certain speech situations. Thus, for instance, it is unlikely that
lovers should indulge each other with diminutive forms of abstract nouns.
The pragmatic meaning of the diminutive suffix depends on the
meaning of the base, too; in other words, the meaning of the base con-
tributes to whether the diminutive form should be attributed both its
semantic and pragmatic meanings, or primarily some pragmatic meaning
only. This does not contradict the assumption that morphopragmatics
is for the investigation of pragmatic consequences of morphological rules.
The input of morphological rules has to include reference to the semantic
range of bases for which the diminutive suffix has the meaning ‘small
events (*ásásocska ‘a little digging’, *nézésecske ‘a little watching’). Examples
of lexicalised derivatives include the event nouns főzőcske ‘a doll’s dinner party’,
fogócska ‘game of tag’, bújócska ‘hide and seek’, as well as tálka ‘bowl’, asztalka
‘small table’, szócska ‘small word, particle’.
14 ‘Typical use’ will simply be taken to be coterminous with frequency of occurrence
in the corpus studied: a use is typical of it occurs at least 20 times in the randomly
selected 500 examples.
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object’. In the examples that follow, the diminutive suffix carries its
semantic meaning only:
(a)(7) Ez a könyvecske az első önálló magyar nyelvű neveléselméleti-didaktikai
szakkönyv.
‘This small book is the first independent textbook on the theory of education
and didactics ever published in Hungarian.’
(b) Mindennap megnézi a postaládát, csikorog a kulcsocska a zárban [. . .].
‘She looks into the mailbox each day, the little key scroops in the lock [. . .].’
(c) Mind ez ideig remélték, hogy a lelőhelyről több ilyen kőlapocska előkerül
még [. . .].
‘They have been hoping so far that more such tablets would be found at the
place of discovery [. . .].’
This meaning can be reinforced by the immediate context (the presence
of the adjective kis ‘small’):
(a)(8) Egész sor kis ablakocska [. . .].
‘A whole row of small windows [. . .].’
(b) A kis könyvecske [. . .].
‘The small booklet [. . .].’
(c) Az a kis házacska [. . .].
‘That small house [. . .].’
In the environment of a diminutive noun we often find adjectives like kis
‘small’, pici ‘tiny’, törpe ‘miniature’ that merely reinforce the diminutive
meaning since in examples like (8a–c) the meaning ‘small’ is present even
without the adjective. To generalise this observation: diminutive forms
of names of physical objects usually enrich the meaning of the base by
the semantic feature ‘small’ and have no pragmatic meaning.
But this does not preclude, even in such cases, the possibility that
the speaker uses the diminutive suffix to convey pragmatic meaning. It
is easy to imagine situations in which the speaker refers to large objects
by könyvecske ‘small book, booklet’, kulcsocska ‘small key’, kőlapocska
‘tablet’. Suppose, for instance, that someone is reading a very large
codex. By asking Mit olvasol abban a könyvecskében? ‘What are you
reading in that tiny little book?’, the speaker may emphasise the large
size of the book. In that case, the use of the diminutive suffix is ‘non-
serious’, since it means just the opposite of what it is supposed to mean.
When ‘small’ stands for ‘large’, the speech situation can invariably be
characterised by the attributes ‘funny’, ‘non-serious’. It is no surprise
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
morphopragmatic phenomena in hungarian 335
therefore that Dressler–Merlini-Barbaresi (1993) takes the feature ‘non-
serious’ to be the invariant pragmatic meaning of the diminutive suffix:
that meaning is in fact present in most uses of that suffix (see below).15
However, the presence of that feature is only obvious in cases where
‘small’ does not actually mean small. In the cases illustrated by (9),
(11), and (12) below, the feature ‘non-serious’ is not present.
Names of tiny animals are often used in a diminutive form, except in
scientific discourse. Pragmatically, the presence of the diminutive suffix
suggests that the speaker wants to express his emotional attitude—some-
thing that a technical text would not tolerate. From the use of diminutive
forms, then, we can conclude that the text is not a scientific one. This
use is illustrated in (9a–d):
(a)(9) [. . .] ahány méhecske egy nyitott mézesbödön körül zümmög nyáron a kert-
ben.
‘[. . .] like the number of bees buzzing around an open jar of honey in the
garden, in summer.’
(b) [. . .] egy mumifikált mutáns méhecske.
‘[. . .] a mummified mutant bee.’
(c) [. . .] tántorog az összeharapdált legyecske [. . .].
‘[. . .] the fly, bitten all over, is staggering [. . .].’
(d) Egérkékkel kísérleteztek.
‘They were experimenting with mousies.’
Bees give us honey, so we tend to be fond of them;16 and we pity both
the fly bitten all over and the little mouse used as a laboratory animal.
Why do people use a diminutive suffix with names of animals that are
small anyway? The semantic meaning of the diminutive suffix (whereby
méhecske = ‘small bee’) yields its place to the pragmatic meaning in this
case: the speaker has an emotional attitude to the entity referred to by
15 This only means, of course, that whenever the diminutive suffix does have a prag-
matic meaning, that meaning may be connected with the feature ‘non-serious’.
Otherwise the feature ‘non-serious’ could be taken to be a semantic, rather than
pragmatic, property. The feature ‘non-serious’ is by no means interchangeable
with the feature ‘ironical’ (as suggested by one of the anonymous reviewers of
this paper) since irony can only be spotted in utterances like (16e) below.
16 The form méhecske is often used for phonological convenience only; the form
méh vacillates between two pronunciations with or without dropping the final h.
Many people simply say méhecske in order to avoid that difficulty (Péter Siptár,
personal communication). In this case, the diminutive suffix does not contribute
any meaning, semantic or pragmatic.
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the noun, and wishes to communicate that attitude. The exact nature of
the emotion concerned can only be determined, of course, by examining
the speech situation.
Diminutive forms of animal names, with the exception of cases ex-
emplified in (9), occur in texts meant for small children (especially in
fairy tales), cf. (10a–d):
(a)(10) [. . .] kis ló, hiszen te beszélni is tudsz, táltos paripácska, kis cigány lovacska.
‘[. . .] little horse, so you can speak, little magic steed, little Gypsy horsey.’
(b) [. . .] kakas és a tyúkocska, szlovák népmese [. . .].
‘[. . .] rooster and the little hen, Slovakian folk tale [. . .].’
(c) [. . .] két iciri-piciri ökröcske.
‘[. . .] two teeny-weeny little oxen.’
(d) Szamárka, ökröcske, juhocska [. . .].
‘Little donkey, little ox, little sheep [. . .].’
The world of tales is an imaginary world, one in which everything looks
smaller or downright small. Words like lovacska ‘little horse’, tyúkocska
‘little hen’, ökröcske ‘little ox’, szamárka ‘little donkey’, juhocska ‘little
sheep’ can refer to full-grown animals, too. The world of tales is ‘non-
serious’ because it does not directly reflect reality. The transposition
of the real world into that of tales is carried out by the help of the
diminutive suffix here. Hence, paripácska is not ‘a small magic steed’,
just like tyúkocska is not ‘an undersize hen’. The corresponding adjective
plus noun constructions (kis X ‘small X’) do not convey the pragmatic
meaning of the diminutive forms. Paripácska ‘little horse’, tyúkocska
‘little hen’, ökröcske ‘little ox’, szamárka ‘little donkey’, juhocska ‘little
sheep’ only occur in specific contexts like tales told to little children or
adult–child dialogues.
Three typical speech situations in which diminutive suffixes are gen-
erally observed to be often used are missing from the corpus.17 When
a mother talks to her small child (motherese,18 baby talk), she typically
uses diminutive forms. The bases concerned are primarily names of body
17 With respect to these contexts, cf. Dressler – Merlini-Barbaresi (1993, 116–70).
The use of diminutive suffixes in such functions is very frequent, in addition to
Hungarian, in Southern German dialects, in Italian, in Spanish and in Slavic
languages, too.
18 Since the speech of fathers, grandparents, close relatives, caretakers may be char-
acterised by the same features, the term caretaker speech is often used instead
(Crystal 1994, 258).
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parts and names of kinds of food that belong to the diet of a small child,
but names of objects with which a small child gets into contact (párnács-
ka ‘little pillow’, ágyacska ‘little bed’, kendőcske ‘little shawl’, labdácska
‘little ball’, etc.) may also occur. The three semantic fields just men-
tioned can be illustrated by the following constructed examples:
(a)(11) Add ide a kezecskédet!
‘Give me your little hand.’
(b) Tedd ide szépen a fejecskédet!
‘Put your little head down here.’
(a)(12) Kérsz még egy kis tejecskét?
‘Do you want some more milkie?’
(b) Kapsz mindjárt egy kis vizecskét.
‘You will get a little water right away.’
(a)(13) Gyere, megigazítom a párnácskádat.
‘Come, let me fix your little pillow.’
(b) Kéred a kendőcskédet?
‘Do you want your little shawl?’
The body parts of a small child are really small — but the amount of
milk or water offered need not actually be little. And what is more
important: one would never offer milk or water to an adult using kis
tejecske/vizecske ‘a little milkie/water’ even if it is a very small amount
of milk or water: (12a–b) thus unambiguously signal baby talk.19 The
same applies to (13a–b): apart from the fact that the pillow or shawl may
be ‘normal’ size, these diminutive forms are not used in adult-to-adult
conversation. And since in such cases diminutive names of body parts are
not normally used either, utterances like (11)–(13) automatically evoke a
particular speech situation that primarily refers to the relation between
mother and small child; but in the case of (11a–b) the addressee could
be a lover, or in the case of (12a–b), a pet animal. Owners of dogs or
cats often address their pets using diminutive nouns. The three speech
situations, talking to a small child, a lover, or a pet, are clearly distinct.
Nevertheless, with respect to the pragmatic meaning of the diminutive
19 This is not to say that diminutive forms may not be used within a family or a
small community even in adult conversation. However, such exceptions do not
invalidate the claim in the text, since in this case an adult listener is treated as
if he was a child.
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suffix, there is not much of a difference: the suffix expresses endearment,
loving, fondness here.
In baby talk, the diminutive forms of names of body parts generally
retain their original semantic meaning; for love talk this does not neces-
sarily hold. An adult foot (if not overly big) can be referred to as lábacska
‘little foot’, and an adult mouth as szájacska ‘little mouth’.
(a)(14) Nagyon szeretem a szép szájacskádat.
‘I love your nice little mouth a lot.’
(b) Mutasd a formás lábacskádat!
‘Let me see your shapely little foot.’
In all three cases (where the partner is a small child, a pet, or a lover), the
use of the diminutive suffix is controlled by the speech situation in which
the decisive criterion is the relationship between speaker and listener. The
diminutive suffix primarily conveys the speaker’s emotion (joy, happiness,
love, affection).
Bor ‘wine’, sör ‘beer’ and konyak ‘brandy’ (names of other alcoholic
drinks did not occur in the corpus) also often occur in casual speech with
a diminutive suffix.20 Since borocska ‘little wine’, söröcske ‘little beer’,
konyakocska ‘little brandy’ are characteristic of adult casual speech, their
use signals both that the speaker takes his relationship to the listener to
be an intimate one and that he is on good terms with alcoholic drinks.
One would never speak of borocska if one did not like wine. The use of
the diminutive suffix does not relate to the amount of drink involved.
Utterances like (17a–c) only occur in adult conversation:
(a)(15) [. . .] a konyakocska helyében [. . .].
‘[. . .] in place of the little brandy [. . .].’
(b) [. . .] egyébként nagyon finom borocska is hozzájárul [. . .].
‘[. . .] otherwise very nice little wine also contributes [. . .].’
(c) Export a söröcske.
‘The little beer is an exported brand.’
Diminutive forms of names of intellectual products, political or other or-
ganisations, as well as functions/occupations are mostly pejorative. The
20 The noun vodka may also take the diminutive suffix (vodkácska) since the ending
-ka is not identified as a Hungarian diminutive suffix in it. The names of other
spirits may, of course, also be diminutivised: tequilácska, cinzanócska, armagna-
cocska, etc.
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positive emotions (joy, happiness, affection) that are so characteristic of
diminutive forms used in other speech situations are not found here.
(a)(16) [. . .] kénytelen turáni újságocska kiadásával vigasztalódni.
‘[. . .] he has to comfort himself by publishing a little Turanian newspaper.’
(b) [. . .] kompromisszumokból álló szegényes reformocska [. . .].
‘[. . .] a miserable little reform consisting of compromises [. . .].’
(c) [. . .] minden kis pártocska igyekszik parlamenti képviseletet biztosítani magá-
nak [. . .].
‘[. . .] all little parties try to make sure they are represented in Parliament
[. . .].’
(d) Ez lenne tehát a Kóstoló című műsorocska „nyári koktélja”, mondja eufe-
misztikusan egy titokzatos hang.
‘This should be the “summer cocktail” of the little program called Foretaste,
a mysterious voice says euphemistically.’
(e) [. . .] nem valószínű, hogy valamelyik helyi elnököcske ugyanerre a következ-
tetésre jut az elemzésben [. . .].
‘[. . .] it is unlikely that some local little chairman should come to the same
conclusion in his analysis [. . .].’
From (16a) it becomes clear that the newspaper involved is not a serious,
well-known one; from (16b), that the reform is not an overall one; (16c)
tells us that the parties we are talking about are not only small but
also insignificant; (16d) that the program is not of a very high quality;
and finally, (16e) suggests that the chairman cannot be that of a serious
organisation or company but that he is fond of making a fuss. These
or similar conclusions can be drawn from the presence of the diminutive
suffix itself; the context, at most, reinforces our conclusion or makes
it more precise. The meaning ‘small’ is in some sense present in all
diminutive nouns of the utterances in (16a–e), that is, their semantics
does not get lost altogether, but the point is not in the semantic meaning.
The difference is clearly shown by comparing the following pairs: kis
újság ‘small paper’ – újságocska ‘little paper’, kis reform ‘minor reform’ –
reformocska ‘little reform’, kis párt ‘small party’ – pártocska ‘little party’,
kis műsor ‘short program’ – műsorocska ‘little program’; elnököcske ‘little
chairman’ cannot even be opposed to kis elnök ‘a short chairman’.21 The
21 It is possible that diminutive forms of words denoting a function or occupation are
all pejorative in their meaning (cf. also igazgatócska ‘little director’, mérnököcske
‘little engineer’); ‘little’ in this case equals ‘insignificant, trifling, trivial, petty’,
i.e., the meaning component ‘little’ is understood to refer to the director’s or
engineer’s significance, not his size.
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adjective–noun constructions do not carry the pragmatic meanings of the
diminutive forms. On the other hand, it is clear that the latter do contain
the meaning component ‘small’; if that was not the case, expressions
like *nagy újságocska ‘big little newspaper’, *nagy reformocska ‘big little
reform’, *nagy pártocska ‘big little party’, *nagy műsorocska ‘big little
program’ should be acceptable.
Let us finally add that some adjectives of negative meaning may
also take a diminutive suffix that subdues or tones down the negative
meaning and hence the impoliteness involved.
(a)(17) Talán, hogy túlságosan szeleverdi? Vagy ostobácska, butuska?
‘Maybe she’s too light-headed? Or a little stupid, a little silly?’
(b) [. . .] bájosan butácska, de hűséges segítőtársát, Hálefet, a szolgát [. . .].
‘[. . .] his charmingly silly but faithful helper, Haleph, the servant [. . .].’
(c) Az viszont gyöngécske érv, hogy lám, a nagy európai [. . .].
‘On the other hand, it is somewhat poor for an argument that, see, the great
European [. . .].’
(d) A gyengécske Trnava elleni összecsapáson a bíró 43 szabálytalanságot [. . .].
‘During the match against the weakish team of Trnava, the referee awarded
43 fouls [. . .].’
(e) OK bunkócska, akkor a Pagony Lajos vagy, ami [. . .].
‘Okay you little boob, then you must be Lajos Pagony, a fact that [. . .].’
We do not always prefer to tell the truth; to name a negative property
is something that we especially try to avoid, for reasons of politeness, in
everyday speech situations. Therefore, we resort to various ‘subduing’
strategies. One of these is negation of the positive adjective: ‘not clever’,
‘not strong’. But we also often use diminutive forms for the same purpose.
We do not say that someone is ostoba ‘stupid’, buta ‘silly’, or bunkó ‘boor-
ish’, but rather that he is ostobácska, butuska/butácska or bunkócska. It
is true that ostobácska may simply mean ‘stupid’ or ‘rather stupid’, but
how much better it sounds! The team is not weak but weakish, which is
less categorical. Similarly, we can say someone is lustácska ‘a little lazy’,
rosszacska ‘a little bad’, betegecske ‘a little ill’. Of adjectives referring
to a positive property, it is only okoska ‘cute little’ that the corpus con-
tained data of; but of course szépecske ‘nice little’, ügyeske ‘skilful little’,
csinoska ‘pretty little’ etc. can also be formed with ease. In this case,
the function of the diminutive suffix is obviously not subduing but rather
being amiable. However, productivity is out of the question in this case
since the range of basic adjectives cannot be freely extended.
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The semantic meaning of the diminutive suffix is in all cases ‘small,
a little’; that meaning can be modified or added to in various speech
situations that are accounted for within pragmatics. We have seen that
diminutive forms are used in various speech situations and that the mean-
ing of the diminutive suffix will change or be modified accordingly, in sev-
eral different ways. In most cases, it signals a positive emotional attitude
of the speaker towards the person or thing denoted by the base, but it
may carry a pejorative meaning, too.
4. The modal suffix -hat/-het
The suffix -hat/-het ‘may, can’ differs from verb forming suffixes in a
number of basic respects: (a) it does not produce a new verb, as evi-
denced by a total lack of lexicalisation; (b) verbs suffixed by it cannot
be further suffixed to become infinitives or participles (*játszhatni ‘to be
able/allowed to play’, *játszható ‘being able/allowed to play’, *játszha-
tott ‘one that was able/allowed to play’, *játszhatandó ‘one that will be
able/allowed to play’, *játszhatva ‘while being able/allowed to play’);22
(c) suffixation by -hat/-het is not restricted by any condition (a property
characteristic of inflection but not of derivation). Therefore, we are enti-
tled to exclude -hat/-het from among prototypical derivational suffixes.23
The suffix -hat/-het can express various modal meanings (Kiefer
1981; 1985). Of the types of modality, it is primarily deontic modal-
ity that is normally taken to be pragmatically relevant, since it is closely
connected to what are called deontic speech acts (command, prohibition,
22 Of course, játszható ‘playable, something that can be played’, formed by the ad-
jective forming suffix -ható, is grammatical; what is claimed to be ungrammatical
here is the participial form (in -ó) of the verb játszhat. Similarly, játszhatott is
only unacceptable as a past participle; as a past-tense verb form ‘he was able/
allowed to play, he may have played’ it is quite all right. Compare a gyerek
játszhatott ‘the child was allowed to play’ vs. *a játszhatott gyerek ‘the child that
was allowed to play’. We only say that something ‘can be derived’ if the forms
at hand can be derived in a productive way (i.e., in a way that can be stated
in a rule). Occasional formations like olvashatni ‘one can read about it’, mond-
hatni ‘one could say; as it were’ are marginal and are not evidence of productive
derivability.
23 Given the fact that we accept the continuum view in this paper, we do not have to
decide if -hat/-het is a derivational suffix or an inflectional one. See also footnotes
4 and 5.
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permission, exemption).24 However, we have to draw a distinction be-
tween deontic modality and deontic speech acts (Kiefer 1998). Deontic
modality only expresses deontic possibility or deontic necessity; in order
for utterances involving deontic modality to express deontic speech acts,
other conditions have to be met, too. Such conditions are a hierarchical
relationship between speaker and listener, the speaker’s conviction that
the action can be performed, and time and place appropriate for per-
forming the action. All in all, deontic speech acts can only be performed
if all necessary parameters of the speech situation are present. Typical
deontic speech acts are illustrated by (18a–d).
(a)(18) Este elmehetsz moziba. ‘You can go to the cinema tonight.’
(b) Este nem mehetsz el moziba. ‘You cannot go to the cinema tonight.’
(c) Este el kell menned moziba. ‘You must go to the cinema tonight.’
(d) Este nem kell elmenned moziba. ‘You need not go to the cinema tonight.’
If the background to the utterances in (18a–d) is taken to be the set of
permitted and forbidden, advised and not advised things, then (18a) ex-
presses that going to the cinema tonight is among the things permitted,
and (18b) expresses that going to the cinema tonight is among the things
not permitted. The present state of affairs may make going to the cinema
tonight necessary, as expressed by (18c), or may not make going to the
cinema tonight necessary, as stated in (18d). (18a–d) as they stand are
statements of facts, not speech acts. They turn into speech acts if the
speaker has the appropriate authority and assumes that his utterances
will have the intended effect on the listener. In such a speech situation,
(18a) can be interpreted as giving permission, (18b) as prohibition, (18c)
as a command, and (18d) as exemption.25 If the relationship between
speaker and listener, the social status of the participants is not the ap-
propriate one, (18a–d) cannot be interpreted as deontic speech acts.26
24 Deontic speech acts are discussed in detail by Lyons (1977, 823–41).
25 Of course, all speech acts that are connected to deontic possibility or to deontic
necessity count as deontic speech acts. Thus, in addition to those mentioned
above, further examples of deontic speech acts include Elmehetek este moziba?
‘May I go to the cinema tonight?’ and Muszáj este elmennem moziba? ‘Do I
really have to go to the cinema tonight?’; the former is an instance of asking
for permission, and the latter is an instance of asking for exemption from an
obligation.
26 The problem of deontic speech acts is made theoretically interesting by the fact
that deontic logic was originally a kind of action logic, that is, it took speech acts
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In the case of some verbs, deontic modality in an utterance always ex-
presses a deontic speech act; in other words, these utterances are always
used in speech situations where ‘deontic’ conditions are all met. This is
exemplified in (19a–b).
(a)(19) Elmehetsz. ‘You can go now.’
(b) Elmehetek? ‘Can I go now?’
It is to be added here that deontic modality, in the case of action verbs,
cannot in general be told apart from other kinds of modality at the se-
mantic level. The utterance in (18a), for instance, may also mean that
the listener will have an opportunity to go to the cinema (circumstantial
modality, cf. Kiefer 1981). Given that deontic speech acts are directed at
actions, a modal utterance containing a state verb like Okos lehetsz ‘You
may be clever’ cannot be deontic. In general, however, the various kinds
of modality can only be told apart on the basis of the speech situation.
But the morphopragmatics of the modal suffix -hat/-het is by no
means exhausted by deontic speech acts.
Although the invariant lexical meaning of -hat/-het is ‘possibility’,
in some circumstances it may also express ‘necessity’. Here are a few
examples:
(a)(20) Nemcsak a rangnak, hanem a tanult foglalkozásnak is búcsút mondhattak.
‘They had to say goodbye not only to their position but also to their profes-
sion.’
(b) [. . .] legalább öt évig dolgozhatom éjjel-nappal, amíg kiheverem valahogy
ezt a sikert.
‘[. . .] I will have to work night and day at least for five years before I recover
from the effects of this success.’
(c) Elrontottam, most kezdhetem az egészet elölről.
‘I’ve messed it all up, now I have to start it all over again.’
In all three utterances, we have to do with necessity: the profession
has to be given up, the speaker will have to work night and day, and
to be its starting points (Wright 1971). The intention that the various kinds of
modality should be given a unified treatment was what led to the insight that
deontic possibility/necessity and deontic speech acts have to be kept distinct
(Kratzer 1978). The distinction between the two also entails that a deontic sen-
tence may express, as an utterance, some other—not deontic—speech act. For
example, the utterance Este elmehetsz moziba, én vigyázok majd a gyerekre ‘You
can go to the cinema tonight, I will look after the baby’ does not express the act
of giving permission: it simply expresses a possibility.
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he has to start it all over again. The suffix -hat/-het can be replaced
by the appropriate form of the modal verb kell ‘must, have to’ without
the meaning of the utterance being lost or altered. What causes that
change in the meaning of -hat/-het? Observe that all three utterances
refer to states of affairs that are in some sense negative: in (20a) people
were deprived of their positions and professions; in (20b–c), negative
context is signalled by kihever ‘recover from the effects of’ and by elront
‘mess up’, respectively. The negative context restricts the number of
possibilities to just one. But if we can only choose to do a single thing,
this amounts to necessity. This is obviously not logical necessity but
rather deontic necessity or circumstantial necessity (one that is dictated
by the circumstances).
If we remove the negative context from (20a–c), the possibility cannot
be interpreted as necessity in them. The utterances below simply refer
to possibility:
(a)(21) Időben érkeztek, s így búcsút mondhattak barátaiknak.
‘They came in time, so they could say goodbye to their friends.’
(b) Hála Istennek, még legalább öt évig dolgozhatom.
‘Thank God, I can go on working at least for five more years.’
(c) Kezdhetem bontani a falat?
‘Can I start demolishing the wall?’
As in other languages (e.g., German, English), modal forms of kér ‘ask
for’ and kap ‘get’ in the indicative or in the conditional can be used to
express polite requests.
(a)(22) Kérhetek/Kérhetnék még egy szelet kenyeret?
‘Can I/Could I ask for another slice of bread?’
(b) Kaphatok/Kaphatnék még egy csésze kávét?
‘Can I/Could I get another cup of coffee?’
It is only first person forms (singular and plural) of these verbs that
can fulfil that function. Though other verbs, too, can be used with the
suffix -hat/-het in polite requests (e.g., Megkérdezhetném, hogy hány óra
van? ‘Could I ask you to tell me the time?’, Kinyithatnám az ablakot?
‘Could I open the window?’), the forms of the verbs kér ‘ask for’ and
kap ‘get, obtain’ in examples (22a–b) are fully conventionalised means of
conveying polite requests. In other words, the pragmatic meaning is not
deducible from the semantics of these forms. This, in turn, means that
polite requests cannot be connected with the rule introducing the modal
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suffix; consequently, it cannot belong to morphopragmatics. (22a–b) are
conventionalised polite formulae that lexical pragmatics is entitled to
account for.
The modal forms of some verbs, including mond ‘say, tell’, tud
‘know’, akar ‘want’, lát ‘see’, gondol ‘think’, csinál ‘do’ have a very
rich pragmatics. Let us see a few examples.
(a)(23) Hát akkor hogyan mondhattad a többi embernek, hogy csak az összetartás-
ban az erő?
‘How could you tell the others then that unity was strength?’
(b) Hogy mondhatsz ilyet, Rózsika?
‘How can you say that, Rosie?’
Uttered with an exclamatory intonation, hogy(an) mond+hat ‘how say/
tell+can’ is a conventional formula of reproach, hence its description is
the task of lexical pragmatics rather than that of morphopragmatics.
The utterances below are different:
(a)(24) Mondhatták az öregasszonynak, hogy a fia rossz, ő tudta, hogy jó.
‘In vain did they tell the old woman that his son was bad, she knew he was
good.’
(b) Mondhatta ő, hogy beteg, nem hittek neki.
‘In vain did he say he was ill, nobody believed him.’
In these utterances, mondhat ‘say/tell+can’ is equivalent with hiába mond
‘say/tell in vain’, that is, (24a–b) mean the same as (25a–b):
(a)(25) Hiába mondták az öregasszonynak, hogy a fia rossz, ő tudta, hogy jó.
‘In vain did they tell the old woman that his son was bad, she knew he was
good.’
(b) Hiába mondta, hogy beteg, nem hittek neki.
‘In vain did he say he was ill, nobody believed him.’
It appears that this interpretation is possible if two conditions are met:
(a) the verb mond ‘say, tell’ has to carry main stress, and (b) the context
of the utterance has to be negative. If, for instance, main stress falls on
the personal pronoun, the utterance turns into one with a deontic (or
epistemic) meaning:27
27 It should be noted that if the subject ők ‘they’ is pronounced with contrastive
topic intonation and mondhatták ‘could tell’ with focus intonation, only the de-
ontic reading is available.
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(a)(26) Ők mondhatták az öregasszonynak [. . .]
‘They were allowed to tell the old woman [. . .]’ / ‘It may have been them
who told the old woman [. . .]’
(b) Ő mondhatta [. . .]
‘He was allowed to say [. . .]’ / ‘It may have been him who said [. . .]’
The ‘say/tell in vain’ reading can only come about if the context precludes
the deontic meaning. In (27a–b) the negative context is not there, hence
the deontic reading is not excluded:
(a)(27) Mondhatták az öregasszonynak, hogy a fia rossz, ő nem sértődött meg.
‘They could tell the old woman that his son was bad, she was not offended.’
(b) Mondhatta, hogy beteg, nem bántották érte.
‘He could say he was ill, nobody discomforted him for that.’
The utterances in (27a–b) also show that the required negativity of the
context is not simply based on the presence of a negative particle or other
lexical means of negation. The listener can only take the context to be
sufficiently negative on the basis of his knowledge of the world and of the
lexical meanings included in the utterance.
The modal verb forms in the examples below play a role similar to
that of pragmatic particles:28
(a)(28) Szép divat, mondhatom.
‘A nice custom, I daresay.’ (= I think it is dreadful.)
(b) Gondolhat játok, nem volt se ebéd, se semmi.
‘You can imagine, there was no lunch, nothing.’
Mondhatom ‘I can say so’ (in the ironical sense seen in (28a)) has been
lexicalised in this form, other inflected forms of mond ‘say, tell’ (like
mondhatjuk ‘we can say so’) do not have a similar function. Therefore,
the interpretation of this use of mondhatom cannot be a morphoprag-
matic problem; it has to be accounted for by lexical pragmatics. On
the other hand, gondolhatjátok ‘you-pl. can think’ is not a lexical item
since gondolhatod ‘you-sg. can think’, gondolhatja ‘you-sg. can think’
(polite address), gondolhatják ‘you-pl. can think’ (polite address) also
have the same function. With these forms, the speaker wants to pre-
pare the listener to some consequences that seem to be natural given
28 The term ‘pragmatic particle’ is used here in the sense of Abraham’s and others’
‘discourse particle’ (Abraham 1991).
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what preceded. The speaker wants to involve the listener in drawing the
appropriate conclusions.
This concludes our survey of the major pragmatic meanings of the
modal suffix -hat/-het that can be spotted in our corpus. In addition
to speech acts based on deontic possibility, -hat/-het can express deontic
necessity as well as lack of possibility (cf. hiába ‘in vain’+V ), and it
can occur with some forms of gondol ‘think’ by which the speaker wants
to prepare the listener to some consequences. Epistemic -hat/-het does
not have a special pragmatic meaning. Semantically, the meaning of the
suffix is clear: it expresses possibility in all cases. All that is added by
the speech situation belongs to the realm of pragmatics.
5. Summary
In this paper, I have discussed some pragmatic aspects of Hungarian mor-
phology. The subject-matter of morphopragmatics is the investigation of
types of pragmatic meaning that can be seen to be connected with mor-
phological rules. My assumption was that semantics comes first; prag-
matic meaning can be derived on the basis of semantic meaning, the wider
sentential context, and the speech situation. Following Dressler–Merlini-
Barbaresi (1993), I have drawn a distinction between lexical and morpho-
logical pragmatics. The former looks at pragmatic aspects of individual
lexical items, while the latter investigates those of morphological rules.
Therefore, the study of pragmatic aspects of lexicalised morphological
derivatives is also part of lexical pragmatics. Pragmatic meaning primar-
ily arises in cases of competing or non-prototypical morphological rules.
Prototypicality has been defined on the basis of Dressler (1989). I have
investigated the excessive, the diminutive suffix, and the modal suffix
-hat/-het since all three of them exemplify non-prototypical derivation.
The excessive is semantically identical with the superlative that ex-
presses the highest degree of the property denoted by the adjective; they
only differ in terms of pragmatic meaning. Words that unambiguously
determine (endpoints of) spatial order or temporal sequence are excep-
tional in that they are semantically ungradable, hence their superlative
also carries an exclusively pragmatic meaning. The semantic meaning of
the diminutive suffix is ‘small, a little’; that meaning can be modified or
added to by the speech situation, or even be turned into the feature ‘in-
significant’ in the case of names of functions or occupations. The modal
suffix -hat/-het semantically expresses possibility; utterances containing
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it can be used to convey various speech act meanings or other pragmatic
meanings. In all three cases, all that goes beyond semantic meaning due
to the speech situation is the concern of pragmatics.
A pragmatic investigation of a number of other morphological phe-
nomena of Hungarian is a task for future research.
References
Abraham, Werner 1991. Discourse particles in German: how does their illocutive
force come about? In: Werner Abraham (ed.): Discourse particles, 203–50. John
Benjamins, Amsterdam.
Crystal, David 1994. An encyclopedic dictionary of language and languages. Third
edition. Penguin Books, London.
Dressler, Wolfgang U. 1989. Prototypical differences between inflection and derivation.
In: Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung
42 : 3–10.
Dressler, Wolfgang U. – Ferenc Kiefer 1990. Austro-Hungarian morphopragmatics. In:
Wolfgang U. Dressler – Hans C. Luschützky – Oskar E. Pfeiffer – John R. Rennison
(eds): Contemporary morphology, 69–78. Mouton de Guyter, Berlin & New York.
Dressler, Wolfgang U. – Lavinia Merlini-Barbaresi 1993. Morphopragmatics. Mouton
de Guyter, Berlin & New York.
Fónagy, Iván 1975. [A] hiperbola [Hyperbole]. In: István Király (ed.): Világirodalmi
lexikon 4 [An encyclopaedia of world literature, vol. 4], 480–6. Akadémiai Kiadó,
Budapest.
Kearns, Kate 2000. Semantics. Macmillan, Houndmills & Basingstoke.
Kecskés, István 2003. Situation-bound utterances in L1 and L2. Mouton de Gruyter,
Berlin & New York.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1981. What is possible in Hungarian? In: Acta Linguistica Hungarica
31 : 147–85.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1983a. A kérdő mondatok szemantikájáról és pragmatikájáról [On the
semantics and pragmatics of questions]. In: Endre Rácz – István Szathmári (eds):
Tanulmányok a mai magyar nyelv szövegtana köréből [Papers on the textology
of present-day Hungarian], 203–30. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1983b. Szemantika vagy pragmatika? [Semantics or pragmatics?]. In:
Nyelvtudományi Közlemények 86 : 5–22.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1985. A -hat/-het képző jelentéstanához: az episztemikus -hat/ -het [On
the semantics of the modal suffix -hat/-het : Epistemic -hat/-het ]. In: Általános
Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok 16 : 131–53.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1998. Morphology and pragmatics. In: Andrew Spencer – Arnold M.
Zwicky (eds): The handbook of morphology, 272–79. Blackwell, Cambridge MA
& Oxford.
Kiefer, Ferenc 1999. La modalité et la pragmatique. In: Revue d’études françaises 3 :
25–31.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
morphopragmatic phenomena in hungarian 349
Kiefer, Ferenc 2000. Jelentéselmélet [Semantic theory]. Corvina, Budapest.
Kiefer, Ferenc – Mária Ladányi 2000. Morfoszintaktikailag semleges képzések [Morpho-
syntax-neutral derivation]. In: Ferenc Kiefer (ed.): Strukturális magyar nyelv-
tan 3. Morfológia [A structural grammar of Hungarian 3. Morphology], 165–214.
Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest.
Kratzer, Angelika 1978. Semantik der Rede: Kontexttheorie – Modalwörter – Kondi-
tionalsätze. Scriptor, Königstein.
Lyons, John 1977. Semantics I–II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Swart, Henriëtte de 1998. Introduction to natural language semantics. CSLI Publica-
tions, Stanford CA.
Wright, Georg Henrik von 1971. Explanation and understanding. Cornell University
Press, Ithaca NY.
Address of the author: Ferenc Kiefer
Research Institute for Linguistics
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Benczúr utca 33.
H–1068 Budapest
Hungary
kiefer@nytud.hu
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 51, 2004
